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I. INTRODUCTION
This Singapore monograph discusses the major challenges and 
policies instituted to build a functioning state, respected for its 
achievements and generally admired throughout the world. Policies, 
institutions, and adaptation characterize Singapore’s continuing success, 
led by the People’s Action Party (PAP). Given the vicissitudes of 
governing, the more recent challenge is the hegemonic rise of China. 
Singapore’s strategies to maintain a peaceful and functioning security 
arena in the Pacific is one example of careful adaptation and response.
A. Geography 
An awareness of its unique and distinctive features is fundamental to 
analyzing Singapore. On August 9, 1965, Singapore became a sovereign 
city-state. Singapore is an island whose only physical link to mainland 
Southeast Asia is a man-made causeway, three-quarters of a mile in length. 
In terms of marine topography, there is no better port in Southeast Asia.
The geological structure of the Malay Peninsula west of the main 
range is such that the coastal strata of rocks slope gently downward, almost 
horizontally out to sea, producing mud banks and shallows stretching right 
across to Sumatra. Similarly, to the east of the main range, the strata there 
also slope gently down, and again there is a shallow sea. Nowhere on either 
coast is there deep water close in, with one exception. A few miles from 
Singapore River, at the southernmost tip of the island, where two offshore 
islands form a narrow strait, a most untypical geological fault has created 
a deep fissure, an abrupt drop, hard against the land. Scored constantly by 
tides that sweep in and out of either end, this narrow strait saved Singapore 
from decay and possible extinction. By keeping the channels clear of silt, 
it helped to make it one of the world’s greatest ports.1
Singapore’s geographical location at the tip of the Malay Peninsula 
has served to increase her commercial position as shipping technology has 
advanced,2 and based on tonnage of shipping entering and leaving the port, 
Singapore is today the fifth largest port in the world and the second largest 
in the Commonwealth.
1 K.G. Tregonning, A History of Modern Malaya (London: Published by Eastern Universities Press 
Ltd. for University of London Press Ltd., 1964), p. 124.
2 See, for example, C.A. Gibson-Hill and George Bogaars, Singapore, Old Strait and New Harbour: 
1300-1870 (Singapore: Government Printing Office, 1956); and George Bogaars, “The Effect of the 
Opening of the Suez Canal on the Trade and Development of Singapore,” Journal of the Malayan 
Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, XXVIII, Part I (March 1955), pp. 99-143.
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The island of Singapore is small, 224.5 square miles (or 226 square 
miles at low tide, as Singaporeans sometimes boast!). With 1,002 miles of 
paved roads on the island (as of 1964), the center of the city is not more 
than 50 minutes by auto from any point. The longest and most circuitous 
trip is from the southwest corner of the island to the northeast, but even 
this journey takes less than an hour and a half by auto.
Since Singapore’s independence from Malaysia in 1965, sustained 
land reclamation has increased the city-state’s size to 277 square miles, an 
ultimate objective being 300 square miles. The gradual and inexorable use 
of ocean water remains a matter of concern to the Singapore government 
because approximately one-third of the city-state is 16 feet above sea level. 
More positively, the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development estimates 80 percent of global trade by volume is transported 
by sea, and the Port of Singapore is the second busiest port in the world.
Much of Singapore’s world famous Changi Airport stands on 
reclaimed land. Ships traveling from Pacific Asia to Europe and through 
the Swing Canal to Asia refuel in Singapore— fifty-four million tons of 
fuel were sold to ships in 2016.3 As one report noted, “To be the Texaco 
station of the high seas, the island needs to maintain vast farms of oil tanks, 
enough to store the 53.6 million tons of fuel sold to ships last year.”
A more recent development concerning reclamation is the fact that 
Cambodia, Indonesia, and Malaysia have halted exports of sand to 
Singapore, though Myanmar continues to sell sand to Singapore.4
B. History 
Modern Singapore was founded in 1819 and from 1824 onward, the 
Chinese formed first a plurality and then a majority of the population.5
During this century, the Chinese proportion has remained nearly constant, 
being placed in 1921 at 75.4% and in mid-1965 at 74.9%. 
Historically, Singapore was a point of entry and a redistribution 
center for immigrants; it was a society of uprooted, itinerant, pioneering, 
3 Samanth Subramanian. “How Singapore is Creating More Land for Itself” New York Times 
Magazine. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/20/magazine/how-singapore-is-creating-more-land-
for-itself.html
4 Ibid.
5 Hayes, Marriott, “The Peoples of Singapore,” in Walter Makepeace (ed.), One Hundred Years of 
Singapore, Vol. I (London: John Murray, 1921), pp. 355-60, summarizes all censuses from 1911 to 
1924, breaking the population down by sex and race. At the time, Thomas S. (later, Sir Stamford) 
Raffles established a British presence on Singapore in 1819, the island was inhabited by less than 
200 persons, all Malays.
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and predominantly male persons. 6 Singapore was, in a sense, a huge 
railway station for adventurers who were staying temporarily as they 
sought their fortunes, almost invariably.
Singapore became an independent state on August 9, 1965, when it 
left the Malaysian Federation. The limited geographic size of Singapore’s 
population and hence purchasing power offered an impetus to develop a 
regional then global economy based on trade and investment in Singapore. 
Fortunately for Singapore, a UN Survey Mission economic report was 
accepted by Singapore headed by an especially capable and astute, Albert 
Winsemius. 
The Winsemius’ report is important to understanding what Singapore 
had to do to survive and prosper. Equally significant was the fact that his 
recommendations were both endorsed and implemented under LEE Kuan 
Yew and GOH Keng Swee. Goh served in several Ministerial positions 
and became Deputy Prime Minister in 1983. Many continue to believe 
Goh was equal in many ways to LEE Kuan Yew in transforming Singapore 
into an economically developed First World State.
Winsemius initially surveyed Singapore in 1960 while chairing a UN 
Security Mission. He recommended Singapore become an international 
trade center, seek out foreign investment, with adequate pay and housing 
for the working class. Some say he was Singapore’s unofficial economic 
advisor into the 1980s. He was careful, accurate, advised, well reviewed 
and adopted.
C. Demography 
Singapore’s current population is approximately 5.6 million. During 
the past decade, the population trends have shifted significantly. Hitherto, 
a large majority of the population was situated in the 37.6 square miles of 
city proper extending out from the commercial heart of Singapore, at the 
mouth of the Singapore River.7 Now, with the mushrooming of housing 
estates, both private and government, the population is rapidly spreading 
6 In 1903, 220,321 persons arrived in Singapore from China; only 6.6 percent were female. Eight 
years later, immigrants from China had increased to 269,854, but the female proportion had 
increased only slightly, to 8.5 percent. Data are derived from Straits Settlements, Annual 
Departmental Reports of the Straits Settlements for the Year 1912 (Singapore: Government Printing 
Office, 1913), p. 299. The two years chosen were representative years. The year 1911 set the record 
for arrivals from China, up to that date.
7 The last Singapore census, conducted in 1957, reported that 63 percent of the population lived 
within the city of Singapore. The population density within the city was then 24,200 persons per 
square mile. State of Singapore, Report on the Census of Population, 1957, by S.C. Chua, Cmd. 19 
of 1964 (Singapore: Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 92.
SINGAPORE: A ST/2Y UNFOLDING 5
throughout the island. See Tables 1-3 for an overview of population 
demographics in Singapore.
Table 1: Population (in thousands)
Year Total 
Populati
on
Residents 
Total
Residents 
Citizens
Residents   
PR 
Non-
Residents
1990 3,047.1 2,735.9 2,623.7 112.1 331.3
2010 5,076.7 3,771.7 3,230.7 541.0 1,305.0
2017 5,612.3 3,965.8 3,439.2 526.6 1,646.5
Source: Singapore Department of Statistics; Population Trends, 2017 
Table 2: Population Growth Rate (%)
Year Total 
Population
Residents
Total
Residents
Citizens
Residents
PR 
Non-
Residents
1990 ʹǤ͵ ͳǤ͹ 1.7 ʹǤ͵ 9.0
2010 ͳǤͺ ͳǤͲ 1.0 ͳǤͷ 4.1
2017 ͲǤͳ ͲǤͺ 0.1 ͲǤͶ -1.6
Source: Singapore Department of Statistics; Population Trends, 2017
Table 3: Residential Status (2018 Mid-Year Estimates)
Residential Status Total
(in 
thousands)
% Change 
(from 
previous 
period)8
Previous 
Period Data 
(in thousands)
Singapore Citizens 3,471.9 1.0 3,439.2
Singapore 
Residents
3,994.3 0.7 3,965.8
Singapore 
Permanent 
Residents
522.0 -0.8 526.6
Total Population* 5,638.7 0.5 5,612.3
Source. Singapore Department of Statistics, https://www.singstat.gov.sg/find-data/search-
by-theme/population/population-and-population-structure/latest-data  
* Total Population refers to the combination of Singapore residents and non-residents.
The resident population refers to the combination of Singapore citizens and permanent 
residents.
8 Refers to percentage change in the latest period over the same period in the 
previous year.
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During the early years of Singapore’s full independence in 1965, and 
certainly for decades before that, Singapore benefitted from the Nanyang 
Chinese, a term used to describe the Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia. 
Referring to a 1990 study by Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade, David Roche concluded, “The diaspora of some 50 million 
ethnic Chinese in East Asia [Pacific Asia] generates a GDP of $450 
billion…the Chinese diaspora generates a GDP equal to forty percent of 
Southeast Asia’s.” 9 Even now, the Chinese diaspora is imposing in 
Indonesia, where it is estimated the Chinese share of the population is 4 
percent, yet ethnic Chinese control seventy percent of Indonesia’s GDP. 
In Singapore, ethnic Chinese people currently make up roughly seventy-
five percent of the population and control ninety percent of the country’s 
GDP.10 Table 4 illustrates Singapore’s ethnic composition as of June 
2018.
Table 4: Singapore’s Ethnic Composition
Ethnic Groups 2018
Total Chinese 2,969,281
Total Malays 535,824
Total Indians 360,528
Other Ethnic 
Groups
128,650
Source. Singapore Department of Statistics, 
http://www.tablebuilder.singstat.gov.sg/publicfacing/createDataTable.action?refId=14911
This monograph does not discuss in detail economic issues in terms 
of worker productivity, domestic worker training, and dependence on 
foreign workers, which appear essential for Singapore employment. The 
summary statement below analyzes foreign talent an economic keeping up 
with technological change with political issues. Economic and political 
issues are further complicated by a current citizen female fertility rate of 
1.2, significantly below a required fertility replacement rate of 2.1 just to 
maintain a citizen population at the existing level.
9 Alexander Larson, “The Chinese Diaspora in Southeast Asia: Gains and Losses,” Moscow: Russian 
International Affairs Journal, January 16, 2016, p. 2). A large majority of such persons identified as 
Chinese and Thai citizens.
10 David Roche, “How Does Your Garden Grow?” Asian Wall Street Journal, November 3, 1995, 
p. 6.
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D. Economy 
The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is an overall measure of a 
country’s economy. By this standard, Singapore has performed well over 
the years (see Table 5). GDP growth plus low inflation are measures of a 
prosperous nation. A brief overview of the Singapore economy suggests 
sustained economic progress since independence in 1965. Nominal GDP 
in 1965 was U.S $500 per capita, by 1990 it was US $13,000 and in 2013 
per capita GDP reached US $56,000. Singapore’s GINI index (the lower 
score the more equity) stood at .417 in 2017. For a point of comparison, 
the following GINI listings are provided: United States .506, Germany 
.500, Japan .49, France .516, and Sweden .432.11
Singapore’s overall prosperity through effective niching in the 
global economy is not without problems. Despite maintaining a steady 2.1-
2.2% unemployment rate since 2000 (see Table 5), Singapore’s economy 
is not perfect. Growing income inequity and those left behind— most often 
older workers and those with minimal education— are prominent on the 
public agenda. Globalization, as in most globalizing countries has resulted 
in losers as well as winners, or at least several of the lower income deciles 
have not experienced the general prosperity. 
As Singapore strives to maintain an affluent economy, growing wage 
inequity is a problem. One of the significant issues facing the Singapore 
government is the fact that the bottom 30th percentile of wage earners 
experienced an income decline between 2000 and 2005 (Chua, 2009: 9). 
The shortfall experienced by many heartlanders is widely discussed and is 
a government concern. Wealth inequality measured from a different 
perspective has remained the same for over 30 years. In 2015, the top 1 
percent and 10 percent of wealth holders in Singapore own around 20 
percent and 60 percent of total wealth respectively.12
11 Ministry of Finance. “Before and After Taxes and Transfers–Singapore’s Gini Coefficient” 4 
December 2017.
https://www.mof.gov.sg/Newsroom/Parliamentary-Replies/before-and-after-taxes-and-transfers---
singapore-s-gini-coefficient
12 See dollar amounts and percentages from Mr. Ravi Menon, Managing Director, Monetary 
Authority, Singapore Economic Review Conference, 5 August 2015. 
http://www.mas.gov.sg/newsandpublications/speechesandmonetary-
policy.statements/speeches/2015/an-economic-history-of-singapore.aspx
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Table 5: GDP Growth (Percentage of 2017 Market Value) in 
Singapore Currency, Millions
Year GDP Percent Change
1996 128,653.0 8.1
1997 139,654.1 8.6
1998 138,345.0 -0.9
2000 162,162.3 17.2
2005 212,074.0 30.8
2010 322,361.1 52.0
2015 408,096.6 26.6
2016 410,271.9 .53
Source: Singapore Department of Statistics, 
https://www.singstat.gov.sg/publications/publications-and-papers/reference/yoscontents
Table 6: Unemployment Rates in Singapore
Year Unemployment Rate as % 
1960 ͻǤͲ
1970 (Census) ͺǤʹ
1980 (Census) 3.5
1990 (Census) 1.7
2000 ʹǤʹ
2010 ʹǤʹ
2017 ʹǤͳ
Sources: Singapore Department of Statistics, 
http://stats.mom.gov.sg/Pages/Unemployment-Summary-Table.aspx#; Singapore 
Yearbook of Statistics, Various Years
E. Trade 
As a globalized country, Singapore’s exports and imports together 
equal 322.4% of GDP.13 Globalization includes foreign investment for 
most First World countries.  Singapore began implementing such a policy 
in the 1980s.  The sustained investment remains economically successful. 
Tables 7-9 illustrate foreign direct investment by several countries which 
have both commercial and some security interests with Singapore. 
Particularly relevant is China (Hong Kong) where exports continue 
growing.  Substantial economic interaction with China is a positive and 
13 “Trade (% of GDP),” The World Bank. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS
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important reality for Singapore. 14 This is one reason that explains 
Singapore’s efforts to maintain positive relations with both the United 
States (security) and China (economic).
Table 7: Foreign Direct Investment in Singapore by Country
(Millions of Singapore Dollars)
Country 1985 1995 2010 2015
UNITED 
STATES
26.7 14,253 67,206.2 243,307.4
AUSTRALIA 2.3 3,131.6 8,296.1 15,500.9
EUROPE 30.4 24,815.7 233,371.0 379,087.5
ASIA 32.6 28,388.4 168,772.1 296,569.3
China 335.3 17,163.2 20,785.8
Japan 14.1 16,969.5 56,005.2 114,185.7
Hong Kong 8.1 3,910.4 19,555.2 48,297.2
Taiwan 0.3 927.9 5,795.4 14,556.8
ASEAN 9.2 5,677.3 32,047.3 47,084.1
EUROPEAN
UNION
6,876.8 20,548.8 117,311.9 292,878.1
Source: Yearbook of Statistics: Singapore, 2016 (Singapore: Department of Statistics, 2017)
Table 8: FDI in Singapore
Millions of Singapore Dollars (Millions of USD)
Year Total FDI China 
(including 
HK)
Japan Malaysia United 
Kingdom
Australia United 
States
1998 $144,197.2 3.7% 18.1% 11.4% 4.4% 2.3% 4.1%
2000 $191,452.5
($82,444.8)
3.7% 15.2% 10.0% 5.0% 2.5% 6.3%
2005 $323,821.1
($191,532.8)
1.7% 13.8% 8.4% 3.6% 4.7% 4.9%
2010 $665,113.4
($507,197.5)
5.5% 8.4% 7.4% 9.3% 7.8% 9.3%
2016 $1,359,476.8
($953,383.2)
5.7% 6.9% 5.5% 5.6% 5.8% 3.9%
Source: Singapore Department of Statistics, selected years. (Singapore Dollars converted to USD on 
December 1 of every listed year. https://markets.businessinsider.com/currency-converter/singapore-
dollar_united-states-dollar)
14 Thomas J. Bellows, “Economic Challenges and Political Innovation: The Case of 
Singapore,” Asian Review Vol. 32, No. 4 (Winter 2006), pp. 248-51.
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Table 9: Singapore FDI Abroad (in Millions of USD*)
Year Total FDI 
Abroad
China 
(including 
HK)
Japan Malaysia United 
Kingdom
Australia United 
States
1998 $75,218.1
(SGD)
26.4% 6.0% 11.4% 4.4% 2.3% 4.1%
2000 $43,005.9 24.8% 5.6% 10.0% 5.0% 2.5% 6.3%
2005 $118,530.3 21.3% 7.3% 8.4% 3.6% 4.7% 4.9%
2010 $325,318.3 22.8% 7.4% 7.4% 9.3% 7.8% 9.3%
2016 $549,470.3 22.6% 6.8% 5.5% 5.6% 5.8% 3.9%
Source: Singapore Department of Statistics, selected years. 
*Singapore Dollars converted to USD on December 1 of every listed year. 
(https://markets.businessinsider.com/currency-converter/singapore-dollar_united-states-dollar )
II. THE POLITICAL SYSTEM
A. The Developmental State
The concept of the developmental state was introduced by Professor 
Chalmers Johnson in 1982 to explain the economic success of Japan. The 
developmental state undertakes an active, often directive, government role 
to promote national well-being in a changing, often challenging world. 
National prosperity and nation-building must be guided by the state –
nurturing, guiding, and on occasion, intervening in a market-oriented 
economy. The determination to achieve national development makes an 
effective state a key causal variable, at times it might be considered as 
state-driven growth. Without state-will at crucial points in the historical 
timeline, would the necessary developmental steps have occurred? 
Developmental states are governed by goal-oriented, purposive, and 
determined elites whose principal commitment is to national well-being, 
not personal aggrandizement. In the case of Singapore, this was reinforced 
by an unwavering commitment to root out corruption as an integral 
component of good governance. A developmental state intervenes in a 
market economy to make it more productive, increase private profit as well 
as public revenue, participate in economic development with a reasonably 
balanced GINI index score, equity investment, and to work toward citizen 
prosperity. It is apparent that the pace of foreign investment began to 
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increase noticeably during the period 1988-1990 and significant growth 
has continued since then.
B. Party History 
Competitive elections began while Singapore was moving toward 
local self-government. One hundred fifty-six thousand persons voted in 
the April 1955 legislative elections. Assembly elections in which just over 
156,000 persons voted with eight parties nominating candidates. Seven 
parties won seats. The People’s Action Party (PAP), which had been 
recently founded in early 1955, won three seats and under 14,000 votes. 
By the May 1959 Legislative Assembly Elections, the PAP had won three 
seats and 13,634 popular votes of the 156,324 votes cast.
In 1959, Singapore basically had local self-government security 
under the collaborative control of British Malaysia (now an independent 
country) and Singapore authorities. In the May 30, 1959 elections, the PAP 
was a mass party. Much of its base supported and was invigorated by mass 
Communist front groups. Election rolls had been further expanded, and 
the PAP won 54.1% of the popular vote and 43 of 51 Legislative Assembly 
seats.
The grass roots base of the PAP was now under the control of left-
wing (often pro-Communist) supporters. It was a tumultuous period. The 
left wing broke away and formed the left-wing Barisan Sosialis. A 
selective but significant number of Barisan Sosialis leadership were 
communists or obviously pro-Communist. Operation Cold Store in 
February 1963 detained roughly 150 Key Barisan Officials and supporters. 
As one government leader explained subsequently to the author, only key
operational cadre were detained, 150-200, not a mass detention sweep. A 
massive sweep but would have alienated an excessive number of persons. 
The intent was to ripple the party, not set into motion massive popular 
unrest and widespread popular anger. The members of Barisan Sosialis 
leadership who were not detained chose not to participate in the 
Parliamentary Elections of April 13, 1968.
The left wing Barisan Sosialis, which had been infiltrated or co-opted 
by pro-Communists or Communists, was no longer a political force. The 
PAP strategy for state-building and nation-building continued to be 
implemented and the distinct possibility of a pro-Communist regime of 
power was over.15
15 See Thomas J Bellows, The People’s Action Party of Singapore, ibid pp.75-99.
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C. Elections
The Group Representation Constituency (GRC) has become a 
significant institution facilitating the recruitment of top quality PAP 
candidates. The GRCs were introduced just prior to the 1988 
Parliamentary elections. Initially there were only three candidates per 
GRC. In each GRC, one candidate must be a member of the Indian, Malay 
or another minority group. Today there are 14 GRCs, all with either five 
or six members each, totaling 75 members of Parliament (MPs). The 
remaining nine MPs are elected from Single Member Districts (SMD). The 
voter has a single vote to cast for the preferred party list. The winning list 
is required only to receive a plurality vote. There is no runoff.
The principal justification for creating GRCs was to insure minority 
representation in Parliament. The government had noted a “voting trend 
which showed young voters preferring candidates who were best suited to 
their own needs without sufficiently being aware of the need to return a 
racially balance slate of party candidates.” (Singapore National Heritage 
Board, 2006: 223).
Under the GRC system, first-time nominees, most of whom had 
minimal grassroots political experience, were able to avoid a potentially 
bruising one-on-one election contest. GOH Chok Tong spoke directly to 
this point. An important consideration inducing a ‘high flyer’ to enter 
politics are the GRC. Senior Minister Goh identified the recruitment asset 
of the GRC a few weeks after the May 2006 Parliamentary election:
Without some assurance of a good chance of winning at least their 
first election, many able and successful young Singaporeans may not 
risk their careers to join politics. “If you’re fighting individually, you 
go through a steep learning curve and you may not have enough 
time.” (cited Xueying, 2006: 1).
Former Prime Minister GOH Chok Tong observed that for a first-
time candidate being on a GRC electoral team ensures that ‘you have a 
bigger chance of winning’. The Marine Parade GRC led by Goh was not 
challenged in 2006 and carried four new MPs into Parliament (Xueying, 
2006: 1).
One reason the opposition had not fared well is that it frequently 
does not offer specific, viable alternatives. The following account by 
Warren Fernandez describes a shortfall exhibited by many opposition 
candidates. Fernandez, now Editor-in-Chief of The Straits Times, is an 
astute observer of Singapore’s political scene. On occasion, though not in 
the following quote, he had been a thoughtful critic of the PAP:
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Consider the case of Singapore Democratic Alliance candidate Sin 
Kek Tong. Five years ago, I interviewed him at a press conference 
held at an HDB void deck, in the run-up to the 1997 elections. “What 
plans,” I asked, “do you have for Braddell Heights?” –the ward he 
hoped to contest. ‘I have no plans,’ he replied cheerfully, insisting 
that he was only an opposition candidate. Out of desperation, my 
colleagues and I threw him a lifeline. What about upgrading, covered 
walkways, better transport?  “Yes, yes, I will do that,” he replied. 
“Any more ideas?” (Fernandez, 2001)
Senior Minister Goh, over the course of a distinguished career, had 
occasionally alluded to political pluralism and the need for more 
independent input. Recently, he observed that ‘as our society evolves and 
the needs of the electorate change, our political system must continue to 
move in step’ (Goh, 2008). He said further that any changes in the future 
must be fair to all political parties ‘and give them an equal chance to win’. 
Mr. Goh was speaking in the Hougang Constituency, a single member 
district controlled by the opposition. 
The current system guarantees there be a minimum number of the 
opposition MPs. The Non-Constituency MP (NCMP) system is capped at 
three. The NCMP allocates up to three opposition candidates who lost in 
an election to be nominated by the President to serve in Parliament. This 
ensures there will be a parliamentary opposition. Nomination occurs only 
if less than three opposition candidates win a parliamentary seat. The 
individual(s) nominee(s) is/are the one(s) who scored highest among the 
losing candidates. Currently, three NCMPs sit in Parliament. 
While speaking in Parliament in January 2016, Prime Minister Lee
committed himself to lowering the average size of the Group 
Representation Constituencies (GRCs) and increasing the number of 
Single Member Constituencies (SMCs).  GRCs averaged 5 members in the 
2011 election and fell slightly to 4.75 in 2015.  Critics of larger GRCs said 
it was difficult for the smaller opposition parties to recruit a full slate of 
qualified and reasonably prominent nominees.  Moreover, it also was 
alleged, relatively unknown PAP candidates were elected principally 
because of the popularity of one or two tested and highly regarded PAP 
candidates in the GRC.  
Furthermore, some argued, noting in single candidate districts 
increased voter identification with a candidate and increased popular 
feeling they were “his or her” representative. Reducing modestly the 
average number of representatives in a GRC and increasing the number of 
SMCs does not reduce the original purpose.  The election of minority non-
Chinese candidates in a multi-racial society– a rare phenomenon when 
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practically a system of the latter would be all single-member districts–
would result in few, if any, minority persons elected.  Moreover, 
ambitious, relatively unknown highly capable persons who went through 
a rigorous vetting process had an opportunity to demonstrate their 
potential and then a worthy performance; avoiding in most ways a personal 
bruising and combative campaign is important for some potential 
candidates.
GRCs protect concern for minority representatives necessary for 
nation-building an optimal People’s Action Party (PAP) objective.  The 
increase of Small Member Districts (SMD) increases a more democratic 
feeling; in a SMD, you are my representative.  This increases the comfort 
level for some voters who perceive one-member districts as the more 
common way for individual voter input to be recognized.  The modest 
reform soon to be implemented is a clear signal that those who want a 
“purist” textbook democracy will cheer this as an appropriate step. 
Dismantling the GRC system could well stifle meaningful input by 
relevant members of voters, a democratic step backwards. Those who 
promote a “purist” textbook reform too frequently cripple the very 
objective they purport to advance.  A pristine world, adhering to the 
highest, demanding logical/academic standards and procedures is rare if 
non-existent. Compromise of the “best possible” characterizes an 
essentially dysfunctional democratic political system.  Singapore 
continues to sustain and move in a democratic direction.  The GRC system 
remains an important stabilizer and input component in Singapore. 16
Table 10 illustrates both democratic elections and the electoral dominance 
of the PAP.
16 For a careful, balanced, and empirical description of possible changes, see Dillan Koh, 
“Strengthening Minority Representation and Political Inclusion,” Institute of Policy Studies 
Commons, January 24, 2016. https://www.pscommons.sg/the-angle-
strengthening.minorityrepresentation   
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Table 10: Singapore Parliamentary Elections
Year PAP % 
of Vote 
PAP Seats 
Won*/Total 
Seats
Opposition 
% of Vote**
Opposition 
Seats Won
Nominated PM 
(opposition)
1959 54.1 43/51 45.9 8 Lim Yew Hock 
(SPA)
1963 46.9 37/51 53.9 14 Lee Siew Choh 
(BS)/ Ong Eng 
Guan (UPP)
1968 86.7 58/58 13.3 0 (Independents)/(WP
)
1972 70.4 65/65 29.6 0 (WP)/(UNF)
1976 74.1 69/69 25.9 0 (WP)/(United 
Front)
1980 77.7 75/75 22.3 0 (WP)/(UPF)
1984 64.8 77/79 35.2 2 J.B. Jeyaretnam 
(WP)/ (SUF)
1988 63.2 80/81 36.8 1 J.B. Jeyaretnam 
(WP)/Chiam See 
Tong (SDP)
1991 61.0 77/81 39.0 4 J.B. Jeyaretnam 
(WP)/Chiam See 
Tong (SDP)
1997 65.0 81/83 35.0 2 J.B. Jeyaretnam 
(WP)/(SDP)
2001 75.3 82/84 24.7 2 Chiam See 
Tong(SDA)/(SDP)
2006 66.6 82/84 33.4 2 (WP)/(SDA)
2011 60.14 81/87 39.86 6 (plus 3 
NCMPs)
Low Thia Khiang 
(WP)/Goh Meng 
Seng(NSP)
2015 69.9 83/89 30.1 6 (plus 3 
NCMPs)
Low Thai Khiang
(WP)/Chee Soon 
Juan (SDP)
Source: Singapore Government Website, General Elections. 
https://web.archive.org/web/20150914182139/http://www.eld.gov.sg/election_results .html
* Includes walkover seats
** The sum of all opposition parties’ percentage of vote
LEE Kuan Yew has personified Singapore to much of the attentive 
world. His commitment to meritocracy is a goal shared by his closet 
colleagues (Lam and Tan, 1999), as well as his successors, and has become 
institutionalized in Singapore’s political system. One of the PAP’s most 
influential leaders was S. Rajaratnam, a founding member, party 
theoretician and publicist, who held several ministerial positions before 
retiring from politics in 1988. He summarized his philosophy of 
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meritocracy: ‘I believe in a hierarchy of merit simply because I cannot 
think of any other way of running a modern society—for that matter even 
a primitive tribal society’ (cited Chan and Haq, 1987: 539).
This commitment to meritocracy is unwavering under the third 
generation of leaders represented by Prime Minister LEE Hsien Loong, 
who became prime minister in August 2004, succeeding GOH Chok Tong 
who served as prime minister for nearly 13 years. LEE Hsien Loong is the 
eldest son of LEE Kuan Yew. Under Prime Minister Goh, LEE Kuan Yew 
served as senior minister. After August 2004, Goh became senior minister 
and LEE Kuan Yew became minister mentor.
From a young age, LEE Kuan Yew developed a belief in elitism 
based on intellectual merit (Barr, 2000). Years later, when he became 
prime minister, he began the process of integrating the merit concept into 
the operational mechanism of the political system. This began to be 
operationalized in the political system when he became chief minister in 
1959. This core criterion—recruiting, nurturing and judging potential 
leaders— remains in place today.
A careful analysis of the steps followed in the case of Singapore’s 
next Prime Minister, HEN Swee Keat, is available in a Hong Kong 
newspaper. 17    The selection, testing, and the consensus of the 4th 
generation ministers is analyzed in considerable detail.
The selection of testing (job performance) and consensus-building 
takes years.  It is obvious this is accomplished with limited personal rancor 
and the leadership united at the conclusion.
D. Democracy
During the first years of independence and after, competitive, secret 
ballot elections continued to be held.  In the early independent years, 
emphasis was on each individual contributing in his/her best way.  
Everyday life was characterized by orderly optimal effort.  Singapore was 
never a police state.  It was, though, a country determined to work in an 
orderly and focused manner.  An ultimate objective was to become a 
prosperous, democratic state with as few as possible relegated to a 
permanent underclass. As then Prime Minister LEE Kuan Yew declared 
during the early years:
“We have all got to travel either on the left or on the right side of 
the road.  
17 “Singapore’s next Prime Minister Heng Swee Keat,” South China Morning Post, November 24, 
2018.  See also: John Geddie and Fathin Ungku, “As Singapore enters twilight of Lee era, ruling 
party prepares for change,” The Straits Times.
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We have all got to agree that when the light is red we stop.  When 
it is amber, we take heed.  When it is green, we go.”18
The strategies and struggle for economic development and political 
stability meant economic development, job availability, and effective 
government policy design and implementation, and combating communist 
activities took priority over creating a Westminster democracy.  LEE Kuan 
Yew observed, probably correctly in 1992:
All people of all countries need good government. A country must 
first have economic development, then democracy may follow. 
With few exceptions, democracy has not brought good government 
to new developing countries… Westerners value the freedom and 
liberties of the individual. As an Asian of Chinese cultural 
background, my values are for a government which is honest, 
effective and efficient.19
Intense primordial or economic cleavage, uncompromising beliefs, 
and free-wheeling electoral political competition at all costs for control of 
national government further divide society and constant confrontations 
and growing cleavages inhibit the emergence of a functional government. 
Determination to acquire or stay in, at all costs, lets power inevitably 
cripple functional policy development.
Despite continuing critiques of Singapore falling short of being a full 
Westminster democracy, competitive elections continued. In addition to 
fair and competitive elections, for many years Singapore has provided 
other mechanisms for receiving public input. The Speakers’ Corner in 
Hong Lim Park, implemented in 2000, allowed public speech without 
obtaining a police permit.  Indoor rallies and public events no longer 
require a police license if the speaker and organizer are Singaporeans.20
Some elections have signaled noticeable dissatisfaction with PAP 
policies. This dissatisfaction has led to an increase in political openness 
and input, particularly after the 2011 Parliamentary elections. Citizens 
expressed unhappiness with public input on significant decisions affecting 
their personal lives. Full delegation of trust and satisfaction with 
government policy was modified in favor of more consultation and 
18 Quoted in Thomas J. Bellows, “Big Fish, Small Pond.”  The Wilson Quarterly (Winter 1983, Vol. 
VII, No. 3).  Pg. 80.
19 Lindsay Davis, Editor, The Wit and Wisdom of Lee Kuan Yew (Singapore: Edition Didier Millet, 
2013), p.48.
20 For a succinct and balanced summary of the election and consequences see Carol Soon and Gillian 
Koh, “Introduction” in Carol Soon and Gillian Koh, Editors, Civil Society and the State in 
Singapore, (Singapore: World Scientific 2017) pp. xi-xxix.
18 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES
consideration of citizen attitudes of input between what is essentially free 
and open elections without any manipulation of vote-counting.
The drop in electoral support for the PAP in the 2011 elections (see 
election table) resulted in part as new younger voters went to vote for the 
first time.  There was also considerable public concern with the 
government release of a White Paper, “A Sustainable Population for a 
Dynamic Singapore,” in January 2013. With Singapore’s low fertility rate 
of 1.5 (2.1 needed to maintain population at the existing level), the White 
Paper proposed that Singapore’s population increase by 30% to 6.9 million 
by 2030.  Many Singaporeans believed such a population increase,” 
mostly of foreigners, meant excessive crowding of a limited space and a 
foreign influx to fill many of the anticipated best jobs as the population 
grew.21
Consequentially, this led to many legal public protests, meetings, 
and a popular vote decline to 60.1% for the PAP in the 2011 elections, a 
significant drop from the 2006 vote of 66.6%.  One example of the public 
outcry was a rally held on February 16, 2013 in Speakers’ Corner to protest 
the White Paper. This rally, which was organized using the social network 
Facebook, was identified as “perhaps the first large, real confluence of 
persons against a proposed public policy. One estimate was that 1,000 to 
1,500 persons attended. This rally is generally described as the “new 
normal” where citizen input, other than elections, can occur if involving 
race, religion or personal attacks on government officials.22
As evidence of public displeasure, the 2011 vote for the PAP was 
the lowest since independence in 1965.  One consequence was that a 
significant number of social measures and wage reforms proposed by the 
PAP government led to popular government social policy changes, 
especially as a result of the 2013 Population White Paper.   
The Soon/Koh book is an excellent compendium of the growth of 
autonomous orderly input into the public policy arena as it currently is 
occurring. In Singapore’s case, as over the world, the Internet is a game 
changer. Fortunately for Singapore, there are bumps and adjustments. 
Nevertheless, the balance with popular input continues to evolve in 
Singapore’s political system.
Today, as the PAP moves the country systematically toward 
identifying third generation leadership, Singapore continues its forward, 
successful journey to political pluralism in almost every way.  It is accurate 
21 The 2010 Census identified the population fertility rate at 1.2, far below the 2.1 fertility rate 
required to keep the population at its 2010 number.
22 For a secured and balanced review of these developments, see Carol Soon and Gillian Koh, 
“Introduction” in Carol Soon and Gillian Koh Civil Society and the State in Singapore (Singapore: 
Institute of Policy Studies, World Scientific, 2017), XIV-XVII.
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to describe the state of Singapore as a First World, developed country with 
free and competitive elections and a variety of places for public input in 
addition to competitive elections.
E. Political Pluralism 
Political pluralism and civil society are not discussed at great length 
in this monograph. The U.S. Department of State Human Rights Report, 
produced annually, provides a temperate overview of Singapore. It is 
obvious that non-violent freedom of expression is generally present; 
though there are some limitations today, they are not severe. While doing 
field work in Singapore several years ago, based on interviews, it was clear 
that the ballot was secret and there was no effort to determine a voter’s 
ballot choice. Voting is compulsory, with a modest penalty for able 
persons not voting.
A recent excellent work, Civil Society and the State in Singapore23
reviews these questions in an open and balanced analysis/evaluation with 
several suggestions on how to increase citizen input, practically. To this 
writer, it seems there is much more freedom of organization, expression, 
and voting in Singapore than often is attributed in the political system. A
major issue today seems directed toward how much will civil society and 
many non-governmental organizations be a sustained voice in the policy-
making process. These concerns are, of course, not unique to Singapore. 
They are present to varying degrees and shapes in all the First World 
democracies.
Singapore like most of the world, is now a social media society. It is 
stated that “70% of the entire population uses social media for an average 
of two hours every day.”24 Singapore does not engage in pervasive, all-
encompassing social media censorship. Citizen input, observation, and 
opinion are frequently shared.
III. KEY INSTITUTIONS
A. Meritocracy 
Preparation for Optimal merit-based achievement begins with 
Singapore’s educational system. Statistics evaluating students are 
23 Carol Soon and Gillian Koh, Eds., Civil Society and the State in Singapore. (London: World 
Scientific Publishing Ltd., 2017).
24 “We Are Social,” Global Digital Statistics 2014, ibid. p. xviii.
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provided by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECP), utilizing data from the Program for International 
Student Assessment (PISA). These global results are based on 
examinations testing fifteen-year-olds in reading, science and mathematics 
in more than seventy countries.
Incredibly, the test results ranked Singapore students first among 
all countries in which students took the test. Test results placed Singapore 
students first in math, reading, and science. In 1959, recognizing the 
challenges of a plural society and an economy then based heavily on trade 
with limited development potential, the Singapore education system was 
substantially expanded to provide public educational opportunities 
throughout the island for all economic strata.
Singapore’s first Prime Minister LEE Kuan Yew noted in 1966, 
one year after full independence, that “…a rugged, resolute, highly trained, 
highly disciplined community” is necessary for Singapore to survive and 
prosper.25 By the late 1960’s, English was established as the lingua franca.
A uniform and common curriculum was put in place, with an operational 
emphasis on rewarding achievement and merit.26
The functional role of the state, in most first world countries, (and 
in some less developed) countries will grow significantly in the decades 
ahead. The difference is that Singapore maintains and will continue 
maintaining a balanced budget, while most First World countries are 
borrowing to the point that national debt exceeds GDP.27
In Singapore’s case, a First World country, it is estimated 
healthcare expenses will double by 2030, from 4 percent to 8 percent of 
GDP. The state portion will rise from 1.5% now to 4% of GDP, quite 
expectantly exceeding military expenditure which currently is about 3.5%
of GDP.28
A meritocracy presumes those with innate and demonstrated talent 
will be an elite. The implementation of meritocracy remains a guiding 
principle of the People’s Action Party’s (PAP) non-communist leaders 
who have governed Singapore since 1959. The success of the PAP, the 
25 John Burton et al., “Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore’s founding father, 1923-2015.” The Financial 
Times. March 22, 2015. https://www.ft.com/content/24145cfe-b89d-11e2-869f-00144feabdc0
26 Zongyi Deng and S. Gopinathan, “PISA and the High-Performing Systems: Explaining 
Singapore’s Education Success,” Comparative Education 52, no. 4, 2016, pp. 449-472. See also 
World’s Leading Education Systems: The Case of Singapore,” British Journal of Educational 
Studies 64, no. 2, 2015, pp. 161-184.
27 For example, U.S. national debt is 105.4% of GDP. In the case of Japan the rates is 253.0%, for 
France 97.0%, etc. Most democracies for now excessively for basic national needs and to need 
popular/election input (needs clarification).
28 Janadas Devan, “Preface—Civil Society: The Idea and It’s Ideals” in Carol Soon and Gillian Koh; 
Civil society and the State in Singapore (Singapore World Scientific, 2017) p. viii.
SINGAPORE: A ST/2Y UNFOLDING 21
world’s longest-governing elected political party, is based on meritocracy, 
incorruptibility and effective policies. Important to understanding 
Singapore’s meritocracy is political recruitment which has been refined 
for half a century. Compensation for the high flyers means elected officials 
and top civil servants are among the highest paid in the world. The realistic 
justification is that you can retain outstanding persons. Comprehensive 
and effective anti-corruption measures combined with high pay means 
Singapore is one of the most corruption free governments in the world.
The early years of PAP rule were characterized by several political 
challenges from prior communist groups, including the now defunct 
Barisan Socialis (Bellows, 1970). But since the 1968 elections, no more 
than three opposition candidates have been directly elected to Parliament 
(so named after full independence), which has a current elected 
membership of 84 members. No opposition candidates were returned in 
the 1968, 1972, 1976, and 1980 general elections. There are several 
reasons for these electoral wins, but the principal reason was effective 
policies by a meritocratic political leadership.
Meritocracy is a defining trait of the Singapore polity. It is worth 
noting here, though, that there is more openness and more pluralism in 
Singapore than is generally recognized, and these continue to expand. The 
US Congress requires the Department of State to evaluate annually the 
human rights situation in every country. The 2007 Singapore report states: 
“There were no reports of politically motivated disappearances…There 
were no reports of political prisoners or detainees’ (US Department of 
State, 2008: 1-3). The absence of such repression can be regarded as a 
minimal benchmark for a pluralizing society. The verifiable absence of 
such oppressive measures is relatively rare among a majority of the 
world’s 200 political systems. Singapore deserves credit, through it is 
seldom acknowledged, for deliberately eschewing such oppressive 
policies.
Robert A. Dahl was a distinguished political theorist whose 
generalizations and conceptualizations were grounded in reality. Professor 
Dahl concludes that political systems are characterized by uneven control 
of political resources’ (1991: 52). The first reason he lists is this 
specialization of functions in society or division of labor. Another reason 
is differences in social and biological inheritances (Dahl, 1991: 52-53). 
Even in full-fledged Western democracies, some individuals specialize in 
government – an elite, if you will.
Meritocracy is a utilitarian formula that asserts those who 
purposefully contribute to a system’s ‘well-being’ will receive the greater 
rewards (Krauze and Slomczynski, 1985; Green, 1981; Pojman, 1999: 89). 
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To assert a small group of persons composes the critical group of decision-
makers is not unusual. It is a norm in Singapore. Singapore’s first prime 
minister, LEE Kuan Yew summarized political Singapore as it existed in 
its early years, and in many ways continues to exist today:
The main burden of present planning and implementation rests on 
the shoulders of some 300 key persons…If all 300 were to crash in 
one Jumbo jet, then Singapore will disintegrate. That shows how 
small the base is for our leadership (cited in National Heritage 
Board, 2003: 90).
The meritocracy now discussed is limited to elected public officials, 
though it obviously carries over into the civil service. Meritocracy, or the 
process of selecting persons on the basis of requisite achievement 
standards, is not unique. However, to apply the principle rigorously and 
consistently to an entire political leadership is rare. Merit in contemporary 
achievement-oriented societies generally is measured by tests of cognitive, 
psychological and social skills, educational achievement, reputation, self-
assurance, and actual job performance. Such a society includes social 
stratification, with individuals rewarded in occupational positions/careers 
that provide varying degrees of influence, compensation, and status. To be 
successful in recruiting the meritorious, the criteria should be understood 
by most citizens, who should also believe that those in leadership positions 
have qualified through achievement and elections. Singapore’s socio-
economic achievements have persuaded a majority of the citizenry of the 
virtue of meritocracy as an objective in the political system.
Abraham Lincoln’s 1854 summary of what governments should do 
is similar to what the PAP has accomplished since coming to power, 
although in very different circumstances. Lincoln (1953: 220-221) wrote:
The legitimate object of government is to do for a community of 
people, whatever they need to have done but cannot do, at all or 
cannot, so well do, for themselves – in their separate and individual 
capacities.
Within a few years of Singapore’s independence in August 1965, 
Singapore faced the closing of the British naval base (1970-1971), which 
directly and indirectly contributed 20% to Singapore’s GNP. After 1959, 
it confronted the challenge of 40,000 students graduating from middle 
school and fewer than 20,000 new jobs per year.
The government’s primary task was fostering an equitable prosperity 
and creating jobs, without a hinterland to create a fallback cushion. 
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Another formidable challenge was the requirement to foster 
multiracialism, allowing room for ethnic identity yet nurturing a sufficient 
common space for national identity to emerge. The dynamics of such 
challenges within a small geographic area (270 square miles today) 
required an active, adaptive and directive government. Virtually little 
could be left to chance.
Given the unending need for policy innovation, the early struggle 
(1955-1963) with the pro-Communists in the party, the parallel need to 
restructure and reinvigorate the domestic economy, as well as the ins and 
outs of Malaysia experience, it is not surprising that a primary objective 
was structuring a proactive, effective government.
Table 11: The Singapore Cabinet
Name Ministry Age Years in 
Cabinet
Highest 
Education 
Received
Profession 
Before in 
Cabinet
Lee Hsien Loong Prime Minister 66 28 MPA, J.F.K. 
School of 
Government
Member of 
Parliament
Teo Chee Hean DPM and 
Coordinating 
Minister for 
National Security
63 21 MPA, J.F.K. 
School of 
Government
Member of 
Parliament
Tharman 
Shanmugaratnam
DPM and 
Coordinating 
Minister for 
Economic and 
Social Policies 
61 15 MPA, J.F.K. 
School of 
Government
Member of 
Parliament 
Khaw Boon Wan Coordinating 
Minister for 
Infrastructure and 
Minister for 
Transport
65 14 MS, National 
University of 
Singapore
Member of 
Parliament 
Lim Hng Kiang Trade and Industry 
(Trade)
63 23 MPA, J.F.K. 
School of 
Government
Singapore 
Armed 
Forces 
(SAF)
Lim Swee Say Manpower 63 14 MS, Stanford 
University
Member of 
Parliament
Yaacob Ibrahim Communications 
and Information
62 16 PhD, 
Stanford 
University
Member of 
Parliament
Ng Eng Hen Defense 59 13 MD, 
National 
University of 
Singapore
Surgeon
Vivian 
Balakrishnan
Foreign Affairs 57 14 MBBS, 
National 
University of 
Singapore
Ophthalmol
ogist/ SAF
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K Shanmugam Home Affairs and 
Law
59 7 LLB, 
National 
University of 
Singapore 
Lawyer
Gan Kim Yong Health 59 10 MPhil, 
Cambridge 
University
CEO/
Executive 
VP of 
NatSteel
S Iswaran Trade and Industry 
(Industry)
55 12 MPA, J.F.K. 
School of 
Government
Member of 
Parliament
Heng Swee Keat Finance 56 7 MPA, J.F.K. 
School of 
Government
Managing 
Director of 
the 
Monetary 
Authority of 
Singapore
Grace Fu Hai 
Yien
Culture, 
Community and 
Youth
54 12 MBA, 
National 
University of 
Singapore
Member of 
Parliament
Chan Chun Sing Prime Minister’s 
Office
48 7 MBA, MIT 
Sloan School 
of
Management
Singapore 
Armed 
Forces 
(SAF)
Lawrence Wong National 
Development and 
Second Minister 
for Finance
45 7 MBA, J.F.K. 
School of 
Government
Chief 
Executive of 
Singapore’s 
Energy 
Market 
Authority
Masagos Zulkifli Environment and 
Water Resources
54 8 MBA, 
University of 
Southern 
California
Senior 
Parliamentary
Secretary
Ng Chee Meng Education 
(Schools) and 
Second Minister 
for Transport 
49 3 MA, Fletcher 
School of 
Law and 
Diplomacy
Singapore 
Armed 
Forces 
(SAF)
Ong Ye Kung Education (Higher 
Education and 
Skills) and Second 
Minister for 
Defense
48 3 MBA, 
International 
Institute for 
Management 
Development
NTUC 
Deputy 
Secretary-
General
Josephine Teo Prime Minister’s 
Office and Second 
Minister for 
Manpower
49 7 MS, London 
School of 
Economics
Member of 
Parliament/ 
CEO of 
Business 
China
Desmond Lee Social and Family 
Development and 
Second Minister 
for National 
Development 
41 7 BCL, Oxford 
University
Associate 
Director of 
Legal 
Department 
in Temasek 
Holdings
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B. Corruption
Two core principles discussed are unequivocal opposition and 
elimination of corruption and meritocracy. With regard to corruption, I 
draw heavily on two analyses by Jon S.T. Quah, the leading expert on 
Singapore’s unequivocal commitment to attack and eliminate corruption 
in government, politics, and society.29
The colonial experience and the Japanese occupation were 
important factors, especially the latter, in facilitating widespread 
corruption. British Colonial authorities opposed corruption but such 
policies were marginally successful. Survival in Singapore (1942-45) 
during the brutal Japanese occupation was difficult under horrendous 
circumstances and corruption was one gruesome tool available to survive.
The Prevention of Corruption Act (POCA) enacted by the PAP 
government in June 1960, under PAP domestic self-government, set the 
stage. The rigorously enforcement of the POCA against anyone in 
government or outside without regard to title or status was unflinching. 
POCA was never used to entrap political enemies. PAP members or 
government officials were never exempt, including members of the 
Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB). “The CPIB has 
investigated five PAP leaders and eight senior civil servants without fear 
or favor from 1966 to 2014.”30 There is no selective enforcement. Persons 
being investigated can have bank accounts, income tax, etc. Critical is the 
fact this person’s “pecuniary resources or property” that are 
disproportionate to their known sources of income is an important 
investigative inquiry.31
The continuing determination is reflected partly by the fact that in 
2008, 81 persons were employed by the Corrupt Practices Investigation 
Bureau and the number employed grew to 232 by 2015.32 Corruption in 
Singapore is below any other country in Asia. The source of integrity is 
29 Dr, Quah, former Head of the Department of Political Science, National University of Singapore, 
is a leading expert on corruption in Asia and the outstanding published authority on corruption and 
its near elimination in Singapore.” I have drawn heavily on corruption control in Singapore from 
recent writings by Dr. Jon S.T. Quah. Singapore’s success in combating corruption lessons for policy 
makers, Asian Education and Development studies, Vol. 6, No. 1 2017 pp.263-74; “Curbing police 
corruption in Singapore: Lessons for other Asian Countries” Asian Education and Development 
Studies, Vol. 3, No. 3, 2014, pp. 118-222; “Why Singapore Works: Five secrets of Singapore’s 
Success, Public Administration and Policy” 2018, https//:loi.org/10.1108/PAP-08-2018-002
30 Quah op.it, p267.
31 J.S.T. Quah “Curbing Corruption in Asian Countries, An Impossible Dream,” Emerald Group 
Publishing, Bingley, 2011 p.220, i.bid p. 266.
32 Ibid, Table I, p. 266.
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obviously an important reason Singapore continues to attract significant 
foreign investment each year.
Though few and far between, as in any country, Singapore has 
experienced rare but noticeable incidents of corruption. A rare but record-
breaking corruption settlement occurred in Singapore in late 2017. Keppel 
Offshore & Marine (Keppel O&M), a component of Singapore-based 
Keppel Corporation, paid fines totaling US$422.2 million allocated 
between Singapore, the United States, and Brazil. Agents of Keppel 
officials made corrupt payments totaling approximately US$55 million to 
Petrobras officials between 2001 and 2014 in order to win contracts with 
Petrobras and its related companies. Several former officials were aware 
of the corrupt payments made in Brazil. Keppel accepted an additional 
warning from the CPIB in Singapore “in lieu of prosecution for corruption 
offenses punishable under the Prevention of Corruption Act (POCA).”33
International evaluations indicate Singapore is well-regarded for its 
control of corruption. Transparency International’s 2017 Corruption 
Perception Index ranks Singapore 6th out of 180 countries. Singapore is 
ranked as being the least corrupt state in Asia.34 Wikipedia considers 
corruption in Singapore as low. Over the years, there have been a few cases 
rigorously investigated by the CPIB. A brief summary of corruption cases 
in Singapore is provided by Wikipedia.35
C. Social Policies and Programs
The aftermath of the 2011 parliamentary elections was an 
unpleasant surprise for the PAP. There was some public concern about the 
high pay for top officials. The greatest unhappiness involved the January 
2013 White Paper “A Sustainable Population for a Dynamic Singapore.” 
The white paper included a projected population of 6.9 million by 2030, a 
30% increase. Many voters believed this would lead to an overcrowded 
Singapore and a substantial increase in immigrants, only some of whom 
would become citizens. This troubled many voters who believed they were
not being sufficiently consulted on basic living issues. Public discontent 
triggered the subsequent response of the PAP government, particularly 
with regard to improvements in social policies and programs. The next 
33 Lindsay Murdoch, “Singapore hit by Brazil-linked corruption scandal,” The Sunday Morning 
Herald, January 9, 2018. https://www.smh.com.au/world/singapore-hit-by-brazillinked-corruption-
scandal-20180109-h0fjdr.html
34 Corruption Perceptions Index 2017. 
https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2017
35 Wikipedia, “Corruption in Singapore,” September 2018. 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corruption_in_Singapore
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election in 2015 led to a popular vote increase of more than 9.7% and a 
gain of 3 seats for the PAP. The PAP had regained its mojo, and continues 
to respond to public concerns. For a list of social programs implemented 
in the aftermath of the 2011 elections, see Table 12.
Table 12: Major Social Policies and Programs
Year Policy/Program
1955 Central Provident Fund
x Forced retirement planning; had 3 accounts
x 1. Ordinary; use towards education/mortgage/stock
x 2. MediSave; use towards medical expenses
x 3. Special; use towards retirement and approved investments
February 1, 1960 Housing and Development Board was established
December 2004 Committee on Aging Issues was established 
2011 3 Core Principles of Ministry of Community Development, Youth, 
and Sports
x 1.Self-reliance and Social Responsibility
x 2. Family as the first line of support
x 3. The Many Helping Hands approach; refers to volunteer
welfare organizations and grassroots bodies working with the 
government as a safety net but emphasis was placed on Private 
Responsibility 
2014 Pioneer Generation Office/Package
x $9 Billion towards Medisave Top Ups, MediShield Life, 
Disability Assistance, and Outpatient Bills 
x Covers appr. 450,000 Sing. Over an estimated 20 years
“Pioneer”= born on or before 31 December 1949 and obtained citizenship 
before 31 December 1986
2015 Launched the School of Continuing and Lifelong Education
x Part of the National University of Singapore 
x Expands offerings to working adults
2016 SkillsFuture Singapore (SSG)
x Statutory Board under the MoE 
x Derived from policy recommendation from the Committee for 
the Future Economy (Convened in Jan 2016) 
x Provides lifelong learning and workforce development 
programs for all ages 
July 1, 2017 Re-Employment Age was made into law
x Employers much offer re-employment to eligible employees 
who turn 62 up to the age of 67
April 2018 Ministry of Social and Family Development handed senior-related social 
support services to Ministry of Health to streamline elderly care
*Recent trend shows added government willingness to contribute with less emphasis on self-reliance 
and personal responsibility.  There was also a shift from focusing on grades to focusing on 
training/re-training the workforce.
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The PAP government continues to emphasize social policy issues.
Prime Minister LEE Hsien Loong spoke to these issues at the August 
2018 National Day Rally. As summarized in Petir, the PAP’s quarterly 
publication, Prime Minister Lee assured Singaporeans regarding 
“concerns about the cost of living pressures, public housing, healthcare 
and education.” These expenditures remain “extremely important to the 
average Singaporean.” Prime Minister Lee declared that “the 
Singaporean government will do all it can to provide support to ease their 
worries, especially the lower-income groups.”36
IV. FOREIGN POLICY
The knowledge and intellectual appreciation of Singapore’s 
relevance and success is well-known and respected among world leaders. 
Saudi Arabia currently initiates wide-ranging social and economic 
changes. The former Saudi Minister of Culture and Information wrote in 
2018: “[T]here is no universal guidebook on how to reform a country. But 
leaders like LEE Kuan Yew of Singapore show how far a country can go 
with the right policies.”37
A. China
In a perceptive piece written by two mainland China scholars 
analyzing relations with Southeast Asia, Singapore is described as 
defending both its foreign and domestic policies. Singapore relies on the 
United States to minimize its security and serves as an “ASEAN” advisor 
to magnify its international influence.
Singapore is a spokesman for Asian values to highlight its own 
cultural autonomy. Singapore avoids a special relationship with China, 
especially on security issues. As a city-state, “it is very difficult for 
Singapore to become China’s primary partner.” It also was noted that 
Singapore can become an important partner, especially in the economic 
and cultural fields. 
Singapore-China relations generally have been smooth for several 
reasons – because of Singapore’s trade worth and investment in China, 
Singapore’s commitment to maintain – as nearly as possible – civil, 
beneficial, and legal economic relations with countries. China’s study 
36 “Government’s new programs for housing and healthcare.” Petir, September 2018, pg 5.
37 Adel Al-Toraifi, “The Saudi Take on Radical Islam.” The Wall Street Journal. March 20, 2018, p. 
A18.
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missions to Singapore over the years and the fact that China regards 
Singapore as a “Chinese” state. There were overt bumps in the relationship 
in 2016 and 2017, a reflection of Singapore’s determination to maintain 
absolute political autonomy and China’s displeasure.
A sharp divergence between Singapore and China occurred in July 
2016. If such disagreements had occurred previously, they were kept out 
of the public arena. A judgment by the International Tribunal for the Law 
of the Sea in The Hague ruling on a brief submitted by the Philippines, 
ruled against China’s continuing economic and military expansion in the 
South China Sea. The Tribunal concluded that there was no legal basis for 
China’s claim of historic rights to resources within the sea area falling 
within the “nine dash line.” The Tribunal also condemned The People’s
Republic of China (PRC)’s construction of artificial islands. The PRC’s 
response was forcefully summed up by a scholar at China’s National 
Institute of International Strategy. He stated the ruling was “biased, unfair, 
absolutely terrible and a joke.”38
Singapore’s response was cautious, relatively neutral, but clearly not 
in support of China, nor a rejection of The Hague Arbitral Tribunal ruling. 
In an August 2016 article, the Singapore Prime Minister LEE Hsien Loong 
said that the Hague based Permanent Court of Arbitration decision was 
much better than seeing “whose guns are more powerful.” He also stated 
Singapore welcomed U.S. engagement in the region.39
Singapore sought to maintain a neutral position and urged all parties 
to “fully respect legal and diplomatic processes, exercise self-restraint and 
avoid any activities that may raise tensions in the region.”40 China made 
clear on this occasion and others that Singapore should stay out of the 
South China Sea disputes. China was frustrated by the lack of Singapore’s 
neutrality or preferably, some support for China’s aggressive actions in the 
South China Sea. 
Singapore’s efforts to maintain a neutral position was not sufficient 
from the PRC viewpoint. Singapore’s Foreign Minister, Vivian 
Balakrishnan, declared Singapore took no position on the merits of 
specific territorial disputes in the South China Sea and urged all parties to 
38 “Beijing Rejects Tribunals Rulings in South China Sea Case,” 
www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/12philippines-wins-southchina-sea-case-against-China.
39 “China Urges Singapore Not To Interfere on South China Sea Disputes at Asean Meeting,” South 
China Sea Morning Post (Hong Kong) August 17, 2016.
40 Ian Storey, “Addressing Responses to the Arbitral Tribunal’s Ruling on the South China Sea,” 
(Singapore Perspective (July 28, 2016) p. 3).
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refrain from provocative behavior. This neutral stance did not satisfy 
Beijing.41
For Singapore, investment in and trade with China is an important 
economic relationship to continue. Singapore also depends upon the 
United States as a principal security partner. This balance between the U.S. 
and PRC in Beijing was believed to be violated by Singapore’s non-
endorsement of the PRC’s angry response. Unhappiness was setting in, 
and would only increase as the year continued. 
Reportedly, on October 1, 2016 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 
Major General JIN Yinan accused Singapore of stirring up Sino-U.S. 
tensions, questioning Singapore’s motives in hosting the Shangri-La 
dialogue, an annual security summit.42 For both Singapore and China, this 
was an effort to sustain important sovereign perspectives and to affirm or 
modestly recalibrate Singapore-China relations. For China, it was a signal 
to position as the emerging hegemon in Asia and for Singapore to not be 
forced into a public position of having to rethink a long-standing, practical 
policy.
China’s frustration and disappointment with Singapore was 
subsequently evident in the China inspired Hong Kong detention of 
Singapore’s Terrex Infantry Carriers returning from training maneuvers in 
Taiwan that had a long history.
For many years, elements of the Singapore armed forces have trained 
in Taiwan. In order to train adequately with armed vehicles, Singapore 
regularly holds training maneuvers in the Republic of China, Taiwan.
China has long objected to this overseas training arrangement with 
Taiwan, but Singapore maintains this is a sovereignty issue and is legally 
appropriate. China, however, “firmly opposes any of the countries that 
have diplomatic ties with China to have any form of official exchanges 
with Taiwan, including defense exchanges and cooperation.”43 China’s 
most recent response manifested its continuing displeasure, though 
avoiding a direct confrontation. 
Equipment is shipped to and from Taiwan during the exercises. On 
November 25, 2016, nine Terrex Infantry Carrier Vehicles were being 
shipped from Kaohsiung, Taiwan to Singapore by APL, a Japanese owned 
container shipping firm. This equipment was detained by Hong Kong 
41 “Singapore Takes No Position on South China Sea Claims, Calls for Restraints,” The Straits 
Times. July 12, 2016. https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/southeastasia.
42 Minnie Chan, “Chinese defence adviser turns up heat on Singapore over South China Sea row”, 
South China Morning Post, October 2, 2016. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-
defence/article/2024158/chinese-defence-adviser-turns-heat-singapore-over-south
43 Chong Koh Ping, Jermyn Chow, Joyce Ling, “China Airs Views on Seized Armored Vehicles as 
SAF Team Reaches HK,” The Straits Times. November 26, 2016.
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customs authorities on November 26, not PRC authorities. The ship’s first 
stop was in the PRC port of Xiamen. Beijing, however, preferred to have 
Hong Kong national authorities conduct the seizure. Singapore, 
responding to specific Hong Kong actions, indicated it had no intention to 
violate Hong Kong regulations.
From China’s point of view this was a(n) direct/indirect signal of 
displeasure in an ongoing and mutually beneficial relationship between 
Singapore and China. Negotiations between Singapore and Hong Kong 
authorities dragged out for several weeks in an orderly and non-
threatening fashion. At one point, though, Defense Minister NG Eng Hen 
described the seizure a “low point” for Singapore from a “defense 
perspective.” These negotiations resulted in the ship carrying the 
equipment being released with its cargo and continuing home to 
Singapore. 
At one point during the detention of the Terrex Infantry Carriers, a 
second incident occurred in August 2017 – the Controller of Immigration 
cancelled the entry and re-entry permits of Professor HUANG Jing and his 
wife Shirley Yang Xinping on August 4, 2017.44 Professor Huang had 
served as the Director of the Center on Asia and Globalization and as Lee 
Foundation Professor on U.S.-China relations at the LEE Kuan Yew 
School of Public Policy. He was charged with providing Singapore and 
academics with privileged information to influence Singapore’s foreign 
policy, resulting in the adoption of a strong pro-China foreign policy. 
Professor Huang and his wife covertly and deliberately represented the 
People’s Republic of China. “The clear intention was to use the 
information to coerce the Singapore government to change its foreign 
policy. Huang and his wife’s continued presence in Singapore was “judged 
to be undesirable…both were permanently banned from Singapore.” 
Singapore Prime Minister LEE Hsien Loong made a three-day trip to 
Beijing in September 2017 to smooth the waters.  Lee and Chinese 
President XI Jinping reaffirmed the longstanding bilateral relationship 
between the two countries, with President calling the visit “a reflection of 
the closeness of the two countries’ relations.”45
44 Royston Sim, “LKY School professor Huang Jing banned, has PR cancelled, for being agent of 
influence for foreign country”, The Straits Times. August 4, 2017. 
https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/lky-school-professor-huang-jing-banned-has-pr-cancelled-
for-being-agent-of-influence-for
45 Christopher Bodeen, “Recent developments surrounding the South China Sea”, The Associated 
Press. September 25, 2017. https://www.apnews.com/3801f989a2ce436a96b242841d451618
32 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES
B. Malaysia
The joint investment and economic development programs 
between Malaysia and Singapore have the potential for increasing political 
and economic tensions. Foremost is the High Speed Rail (HSR) linking 
Singapore with Kuala Lumpur, the capital of Malaysia. Singapore has 
already spent US$182 million (S$250 million) on the project and will 
spend another S$40 million by the end of 2018. Singapore’s Transport 
Minister said “taxpayers’ money” already spent is “wasted expenditure” if 
the project is cancelled. A concern was as of July 10, Kuala Lumpur had 
not replied and Singapore expenditures were continuing. By July 10, 
Singapore had received no clarification and consequently was continuing 
with the project and appropriate expenditures. 
In June, Singapore expended $6 million and planned to spend the 
same amount in July. The Singapore portion is that the HSR was a binding 
agreement and if not fulfilled will require Kuala Lumpur to repay 
Singapore the expended funds. As of early July 2018, Singapore had 
already spent S$250 million and anticipated another S$40 million by the
end of 2018.46
Complicating this issue is Prime Minister Mahathir’s review of 
mega-project deals such HSR involving China which were signed by the 
now defeated Barisan Nasional government. Chinese firms were expected 
to secure most of the construction, overpriced, rising Chinese labor, and 
“irregular financial practices.”47
International investment and trade with China may be changing 
under the Mahathir government. It is worth noting China was Malaysia’s 
most important trading partner under the previous government led by the 
UMNO dominated National Front under the leadership of Najib Razak 
(currently under arrest), a former protégé of Prime Minister Mahathir 
Mohamad.
Some Chinese economic activities in Malaysia, should they come 
to fruition, would cause harm to Singapore’s economy. Rail shipments 
within the regions with goods headed to China when earlier planned 
China-funded put construction and the reopened East Coast Railway on 
expansion are completed, as anticipated, two years ago under the Mahathir 
46 Christopher Tan, “Khaw: S'pore has already spent over $250m on HSR project - Another $40m 
will be spent by year-end; a significant sum will be wasted if project does not proceed”, Business 
Times (Singapore), July 10, 2018. 
https://infoweb.newsbank.com/resources/doc/nb/news/16D128P974B36CBO?pzWorldNews
47 Tang Siew Mun, “China’s Infrastructure Strategy under Review in Malaysia,” ISEAS Yusof Ishak 
Institute, June 18, 2018. https://www.iseas.edu.sg/medias/commentaries/item/7734-chinas-
infrastructure-strategy-under-review-in-malaysia-by-tang-siew-mun
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national government in Kuala Lumpur. The double track East Coast rail 
lines, anticipated to be completed in the early 2020s, is/was funded by 
Beijing and scheduled to be completed by a PRC state-owned construction 
company. One port and logistics consultant summarized the challenge to 
Singapore as it existed in January 2017:
This is a dream of a lifetime for Malaysia to eventually stop cargoes 
transiting through Singapore, with the generous inflow of direct 
investment and expertise from China now. In ten years or so, 
Malaysia can say bye-bye to Singapore.48
Clearly, Singapore-China issues were partly at least impacted by 
Malaysia-China interaction under XI Jinping in mid-2018. It was reported 
that China intended to invest US$7.2 billion in Malacca, a small port city 
on the Strait of Malacca, which would become a new deep sea port that 
ultimately would draw substantial business from the Port of Singapore. A 
deep sea Malacca port ultimately would also provide China with 
significant access and input on the functioning of the Strait of Malacca. It 
was also reported that by 2018 China committed to import Malaysian 
goods worth US $2 trillion over the coming five years, an 800% increase 
over 2016 imports. China was the largest importer of Malaysian goods 
from 2009-2017.49
The defeat of the United Malays National Organization (UMNO)-
dominated Alliance and the victory of the Pakatan Harapan led by 
Mahathir Mohamad, who previously served as Alliance Prime Minister 
from 1981-2003, brought an end to Chinese economic and political 
expansion in Malaysia. It should be noted that there were hidden costs in 
the Chinese contracts which led to significant cost inflation. It was 
subsequently reported that the next election winners received offers to cut 
the cost of the High Speed Rail project by 50%.50 The Malaysian intrigues 
are compounded by Chinese discussions with Thailand to vet a Panama-
48 Ho Wah Foon, “China Projects to Hit Singapore,” The Star, January 15, 2017. 
https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2017/01/15/china-projects-to-hit-singapore-the-giant-
republics-aggressive-investments-in-ports-and-rail-links-i/. See also Jonathan Lim, “The Canal That 
Will Sink Singapore’s Maritime Trade Dominance is One Step Close to Fruition.” This article 
further stated “If nothing falls through, the Kra Canal could be a reality in 10 years at the cost of US 
$36 billion.
49 “China wants this Malaysian port to rival Singapore (and that’s not all)” Today, July 24, 2018. 
https://www.todayonline.com/world/asia/chinese-money-pouring-malaysia-could-help-najib-votes 
50 Shannon Tech, “HSR could be revived if cost is cut: Malaysia finance minister Lim Guan Eng”, 
The Straits Times. July 11, 2018. https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/hsr-could-be-revived-if-
cost-is-cut-guan-eng
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type canal through the Kra Isthmus—a significant economic threat to the 
Port of Singapore. 
While Malaysia adjusts its policy toward China and Chinese 
investment, it is relevant to note, that three years ago, under the UMNO 
dominated government, which just lost power, Washington and Kuala 
Lumpur were discussing increased monitoring of Chinese activities in the 
South China Sea.51
C. United States
Singapore continues to have close important relations with the United 
States in terms of investment, trade and national security. Balancing these 
with its China interactions is crucial for Singapore. It is noteworthy that 
while Singapore recognizes China’s importance in Pacific Asia, security 
is grounded on the United States and friends maintaining a favorable 
power balance in Pacific Asia. 
An important fact underlying the Singapore-China relationship is a 
military association between Singapore and the United States dating back 
to November 1990. That November, an agreement was reached allowing 
the United States access to Singapore’s Paya Lebar airfield and the use of 
existing facilities at Sembawang port. In January 1995, Singapore 
announced it would build a new harbor with U.S. specifications. 
Subsequently, a deep-draft pier was constructed at Singapore’s expense at 
Changi Naval Base, which now accommodates U.S. aircraft carriers, as 
well as naval aircraft from other countries, including China. The new deep 
vessel pier at Changi Naval Base includes four miles of wharf space. This 
has made it possible to provision and service large U.S. warships, 
including battle ships and aircraft carriers. A facility this large is not 
required by the Singapore Navy, which at that time had no ship larger than 
a frigate. This construction provides critical support to the U.S. Seventh 
Fleet. 
The Commander Logistics Group, Western Pacific (COMLOC 
WESTPAC), was established in Singapore in 1992, providing food 
supplies, ordinance, fuel, and repair parts for the U.S. Seventh Fleet. The 
United States regularly patrols 51 million square miles of the Pacific and 
Indian Oceans. 
The United States signed a “Strategic Framework Agreement” with 
Singapore in 2005. Though not a formal treaty, it allows the U.S. military 
51 Josh Rogin, “Malaysia and U.S. in Talks to Ramp Up China Spying,” Bloomberg. September 3, 
2015. https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2015-09-03/malaysia-and-u-s-in-talks-to-ramp-up-
china-spying
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(ships and aircraft) access to Singapore for repair and resupply, etc. This 
was the first time such an agreement was signed with a foreign country. 
Access by U.S. surveillance aircraft, with a focus on the South China Sea, 
is substantial and is a critical component of U.S. defense policy in Asia. 
These arrangements exist principally to traverse and monitor, hopefully, 
thereby restrain the PRC’s sustained efforts to expand its activities in the 
South China Sea and Pacific Asia. An enhanced cooperation agreement 
was agreed upon between Singapore and the United States in 2015 as PRC 
activities continued to increase.
U.S. military planes for several years have made rotational 
deployments from Singapore’s Paya Lebar Airbase. The U.S. Navy’s 
deployment of the P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft began in 
December 2015. The P-8 is excellent for maritime surveillance 
(particularly over the South China Sea). There also have been a number of 
aerial incidents with Chinese forces. The P-8 has multi-mission 
capabilities, including over-the-horizon missile targeting and anti-
submarine warfare. “The P-8’s role in hunting submarines stationed on 
Hainan Island and in challenging Beijing’s South China Sea claim” has 
often been talked about.52
One of the key pillars of Singapore-United States defense 
cooperation is joint military exercises, the largest and most well-known 
being the Rim of the Pacific Military Exercises (RIMPAC). As an 
organizational entity, RIMPAC dates back to 1971 and initially involved 
four nations; Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States. 
Today, the Pacific Rim biennial exercises include up to twenty-one 
nations, from Europe, Latin America, Israel, Canada, to the United States. 
These military trainings include both sea and land exercises. The 
supporters of RIMPAC say the principle reason d’etre is to train for war 
and thus ultimately prevent war. 
Singapore has participated regularly in RIMPAC’s biennial military 
exercise. During the July 2016 Exercise RIMPAC, the Singapore Military 
of Defense spoke with pride that Singapore was joining with assets from 
25 other countries. “This is the third consecutive time RIMPAC that the 
Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN) is commanding a task unit.”53
During the 2018 exercises held at Pohakuloa Training Center on 
Hawaii Island, land forces from Indonesia, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Japan, 
52 Swee Lean Collin Koh, “Viewing the U.S. Navy’s P-8 Deployment to Singapore in Perspective,” 
Foreign Policy Journal, December 11, 2015, p. 3. See also “497th Combat Training Squadron’, 
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/usaf/497cts.htm
53 MINDEF Singapore, News Release, RSN Takes on Bigger Leadership Role in Exercise RIMPAC, 
17 July 2016.
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Australia, South Korea, the Philippines, New Zealand, Tonga, Chile, and 
the United States conducted a week of war games.54 China’s People’s 
Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) participated in the 2014 and 2016 
exercises but, as noted, was “disinvited” in 2018 because of China’s 
“militarization” of the South China Sea.55
Although Singapore does not have a formal defense security treaty 
with the United States, there is no doubt, however, that Singapore is a U.S. 
military ally in the quest for a shared peaceful Pacific Asia and Asia 
generally.  As an early model of a globalized state, Singapore’s policy of 
free trade as well as soliciting foreign investment and investing 
opportunities abroad means Singapore desires a peaceful and non-
threatening international environment. As nearly as possible, Singapore 
seeks harmonious interaction with as many states as possible.  The United 
States’ presence in Pacific Asia is considered as the core of a security 
policy which facilitates commercial and diplomatic interaction worldwide. 
However, an overt friendship policy with as many countries as 
feasible is one component in the objective of a peaceful Asia.  A 
longstanding and stable military association with the United States is a 
cornerstone in Singapore’s promotion of a peaceful order and stable 
interaction.  Part of the strategy to achieve these goals of economic and 
cultural interaction is a wide range of military associations with a variety 
of countries.  These interactions facilitate Singapore’s acquisition of 
updates and top-tier knowledge and practices. To these ends, the 
Singapore government identifies eleven countries with which the 
Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) conducts bilateral and multilateral 
exercises with militaries around the world:  
The foreign environment often allows the SAF to conduct training 
at a larger scale, scope and complexity that it cannot achieve in land-
scarce Singapore and enables the SAF to advance its operational 
capabilities and train its soldiers in a realistic and tough 
environment.56
The eleven states Singapore militarily interacts with individually or 
in groups include Australia, Brunei, China, Germany, India, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, New Zealand, South Africa, Thailand, and the USA.  Singapore 
strategy and tactics are improved and refined and the possibility of 
54 In Letman, “RIMPAC Makes Its Mark in Hawaii,” The Diplomat, July 25, 2018. https:// 
https://thediplomat.com/2018/07/rimpac-makes-its-mark-in-hawaii/
55 Lolita C. Baldor, “James Mattis warns China over 'militarization' of South China Sea” The 
Washington Times, June 2, 2018.
56 “SAF Exercise” Singapore: Ministry of Defense, June 30, 2018.  https://www.mindef.govt.sg.
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subsequent hostile confrontation is reduced. See Table 13 for a list of 
bilateral and multilateral defense exercises that Singapore regularly 
participates in.
Table 13: Singapore Foreign Defense Exercises
Exercise Partner Countries
Agni Warrior India
Airguard Brunei
ASEAN Defense Ministers' 
Meeting (ADMM)- Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, India, Indonesia,
Plus Exercises Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, New Zealand,
the Philippines, China, Russia, South Korea,
Thailand, United States, Vietnam
ASEAN-China Maritime 
Exercise The Philippines, China, Thailand, Vietnam
Bersama Lima* Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, United
Kingdom
Bold Kurukshetra India
Brightfire South Africa
Camar Indopura Indonesia
Chandrapura Indonesia
Cooperation (planned for 
2019) China
Cooperation Afloat 
Readiness 
and Training Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia,
(CARAT) Malaysia, the Philippines, Sri Lanka Thailand
Cope Tiger Thailand
Cobra Gold Thailand
Daring Warrior United States
Elang Indopura Indonesia
Forging Sabre United States
Green Flag East United States
Kakadu
Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, 
Canada,
Chile, Cook Islands, Fiji, France, India, 
Indonesia,
Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua
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New Guinea, China, the Philippines, South 
Korea,
Sri Lanka, Thailand, Timor Leste, Tonga, 
United
Arab Emirates, United States, Vietnam
Kocha Singa Thailand
Lightning Strike United States
Lion Walk/Kiwi Walk New Zealand
Maju Bersama Brunei
Malapura Malaysia
Matilda Australia
Milan Australia, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Indonesia,
Kenya, Malaysia, Mauritius, Myanmar, New
Zealand, Oman, Seychelles, Singapore, Sri 
Lanka,
Tanzania, Thailand, Vietnam
Panzer Strike Germany
Pitch Black Australia, Canada, France (New Caledonia),
Germany, India, Indonesia, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Thailand, Malaysia, United States
Source: Singapore Ministry of Defence, The Straits Times, and others
*These exercises are a component of the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), which are a
series of defense relationships between Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and the United 
Kingdom.
V. CONCLUSION
Economic and political change and adaptation continues apace.  The 
overall record of economic growth, political liberalization, leadership 
transition, and adaptive policies remains impressive.  The continuing 
challenges posed by China’s hegemonic policies require continual 
vigilance.  To date, Singapore’s military association and interaction with 
numerous governments has maintained the necessary economic and 
security stability.  Singapore remains a model of development, both 
economic and political. Many current government programs and policies 
are worthy of adaptation by political systems around the world.
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